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benefit test alone, without any distributional concern, given “standard simplifying
assumptions.” This paper, on the contrary, demonstrates that distributional weights, equal
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1According to Dasgupta (1998, p. 145, footnote 11), empirical evidence on choice under
uncertainty suggest a value of around 2, or slightly larger. Blanchard and Fischer (1989, p. 44) report
that results based on intertemporal choices vary greatly, but are often around or larger than unity.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) often tends to focus solely on efficiency, by simply comparing
aggregate willingness to pay (WTP) figures with costs. Still, from the public policy
discussions it is clear that distributional matters are often very important. Distributional
weights, when applied, are typically based on the social marginal utility of income; see e.g.
Drèze (2000) for recent arguments in favor of weighted CBA. Consider the frequently used
assumption of a utilitarian social welfare function (SWF), and utility functions characterized
by constant relative risk aversion equal to 2 (in income).1 The benefit to a person who is 100
times richer than another one should then be given a weight of only 1/10,000 ( )1 1002/
relative to the poor. Obviously, the outcome of the CBA can then be very different with and
without weights for projects that particularly benefit either rich or poor people. 
However, given that equity aspects are intrinsically important, it is still not obvious
that one should apply distributional weights in CBA. One may instead, following Harberger
(1978, 1980), argue that it is more efficient to focus solely on efficiency in CBA and leave
distributional considerations to income taxation. Much of the policy discussion, for or
against the view of Harberger, has been based on a rather general and intuitive level, and the
main issue seems to have been how distortionary the income tax is, that is, how costly it
would be to reach distributional goals by income taxes instead; see e.g. Layard (1980),
Squire (1980), and Brent (1984, 1996). 
The more thorough theoretical analysis, undertaken in a general equilibrium
framework, has to a large extent focused on the case when we may use optimal non-linear
income taxes. The key-results here are due to Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979), published in
2Boadway and Keen (1993) showed that it is sufficient that the utility function for an
individual i may be written , where x and G are private and public consumption,u i ' u i (f (x i,G), l i)
respectively, and l is leisure. Hence, it is sufficient that all individuals have an identical sub-utility
function f; the overall utility function need not be identical for the Samuelson rule to be valid.
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this journal, soon followed by Christiansen (1981). Both derived conditions for when the
basic Samuelson (1954) rule (3  MRS = MRT) can be applied without adjustments for
distributional concern and incentive effects. Christiansen (1981) showed the striking result
that an optimal non-linear income tax together with weak separability in the utility function
(identical for all individuals) between private and public goods on the one hand, and leisure
on the other, are sufficient conditions.2 However, it is somewhat surprising to see how little
influence these seminal papers have had on the applied CBA literature, given the obvious
policy content. One can only speculate about the reasons for this; possibly, CBA
practitioners find the somewhat technical presentations in these papers difficult to follow,
or they may simply be skeptical to the applicability of the results outside the assumptions
made. 
More recently, Kaplow (1996) in an influential paper argued again for the use of the
standard cost-benefit test alone, ignoring distributional and excess-burden effects, based on
what he denotes “standard simplifying assumptions”, which are largely the same as the ones
used by Christiansen. Still, from a policy perspective the most relevant issue may not be to
find clear results under special assumptions, which one typically knows are not strictly
fulfilled anyway, but to get some information about roughly how valid the results are in the
real world. For example, if the separability assumptions assumed by Christansen (and
Kaplow) do not hold, can we then say anything generally about distributional concern in
CBA? Or, in the example above, can we say that, given that we can use income taxation to
deal with equity, the theoretically appropriate weights given to rich and poor people,
3See for example Easterlin (1995) and Oswald (1997) for recent surveys concluding that
relative income seems to be much more important for individual well-being than absolute income. See
Solnick and Hemenway (1998) and Johansson-Stenman et al. (2001) for recent economic experiments
suggesting that both absolute and relative income are important.
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respectively, would most likely not differ by more than say a factor 5, unless we make very
unreasonable or counterintuitive assumptions? 
Although no authors have made any explicit claims about the applicability of the
results outside the assumptions made, the paper by Kaplow do include recommendations for
real policy, and not just special theoretical results. As expressed by Ng (2000a): “...the
results of Christiansen and his followers are presented as a special case (of weak
separability), while Kaplow argues for the simple benefit/cost ratio as the benchmark,
presumably regarding the deviation caused by non-separability (which may go either way)
as a secondary complication that should be disregarded in the basic analysis and probably
in most real-world applications (where the sign of the required deviation may not be
known).” The analysis by Ng (2000a, b), which largely supports Kaplow, is made in the
same spirit (as, one may add, is the discussion in this paper), although he insightfully adds
some important non-standard qualifications for the Kaplow conclusions. In particular he
notes that the existence of relative income effects (Ng, 1987a),3 or diamond goods (Ng,
1987b), would tend to favor higher public spending, and that there may be other
distortionary costs associated with taxation besides those related to labor supply, which
would go in the other direction. There is almost no discussion, however, in either Kaplow,
or Ng (2000a, b) concerning if, and if so when and how, it would be appropriate to explicitly
make distributional concern in public good provision outside the case analyzed. There is
some discussion regarding the case when the tax system, for whatever reason, cannot be
adjusted in an appropriate way. About this, however, Ng (2000a, 257) colorfully states that
5“while we may try to do good by stealth in the short run, and proceed to use distributional
weights, in the long run this will be known and cause disincentive effects.” Similarly, Frank
(2000, p. 917) recently stated (based on no formal analysis): “We can employ unweighted
willingness-to-pay measures without apology, and use the welfare and tax system to
compensate low-income families ex ante for the resulting injury. [...] Rich and poor have an
interest in making the economic pie as large as possible. Any policy that passes the cost-
benefit test makes the economic pie larger. And when the pie is larger, anyone can have a
larger slice.” The same view is repeated in the  innovative and potentially best-selling text-
book by Frank and Bernanke (2001). But can we really say that the economic pie would
typically be smaller if we use distributional weights in CBA?
To analyze distributional concern in CBA outside the special assumption used by
Christiansen, Kaplow and others is the main purpose of this paper. One obvious way is to
consider other frequently used simplifying assumptions, and to see whether the policy
conclusions appears to be fairly similar. Here we will focus on the case where utility is
(weakly) separable in the public goods, instead of in leisure. Although empirical evidence
on this point seems almost non-existent it is a very often used assumption in the literature,
and for example Starret (1988, p. 173) argues that “a general project has no obvious net
complementarity.” 
Diamond (1975) and Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, pp. 496-7) have derived expressions
for the optimal provision of public goods under optimal linear taxation, given this type of
separability. It is clear from their work that distributional weights should then be applied.
One may then wonder whether this result would hold also in the case of non-linear or
piecewise linear income taxes? And what about the more realistic case of non-optimal taxes?
As demonstrated in Section II, it turns out that in all these cases ‘full’ distributional weights
should be used, so that the relative weights in the initial example would still vary by a factor
610,000!
Another main point in Kaplow’s paper is that the practice of adjusting (downwards)
the appropriate amount of public goods due to excess burden of taxation can be questioned.
Although not the main issue in this paper, in Section 4 we will briefly discuss the optimal
amount of public goods provided under optimal (linear or non-linear) taxation relative to the
basic Samuelson rule. As we will see, the results imply that for the kind of separable public
goods assumed here, the optimal provision may be either below or above the Samuelson
rule, depending on the distributional properties of the public good and on the income (not
the substitution) effects of the labor supply elasticities. Hence, a possible deviation from the
Samuelson rule is not based on the conventional efficiency-based marginal cost of funds
argument, which supports Kaplow’s general criticism in this respect. 
We will also discuss some special cases in Section IV, including the one where both
types of separability holds simultaneously. In this case it seems that we should both apply
weights and not apply weights! However, as will be shown this apparent contradiction is an
illusion, since in this case the marginal WTP for all public goods will vary with income in
an identical manner. Section V summarizes and discusses conclusions for policy more
generally.  
II DISTRIBUTIONAL WEIGHTS
Separability in public goods
Assume that the government’s objective is to maximize a general Bergson-Samuelson SWF
 satisfying the Pareto criterion, where ui is utility for individual i, subject tow u u un( , ,..., )1 2
a public budget constraint. Consider now the problem of supplying two different public
goods, with different distributional characteristics; one may be preferred mainly by poor
people and the other by the rich. Utility is separable in the public goods, as follows:
4Following the terminology by Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), and hence not the one by
Diamond (1975). For a utilitarian SWF we have of course that , i.e. the individual marginala ¶
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 (1)U u f x l G Gi i i i i= ( ( , ), , )1 2
where x is after-tax private income, l is leisure, and G1 and G2 are public goods. In other
words, the marginal rate of substitution, and hence the choice, between leisure and private
consumption is unaffected by provision of G1 and G2.  This implies that for any size of the
public budget (i.e. optimal or not), and for any taxation system (optimal or not), we should
choose the combination of G1 and G2  which contributes most to social welfare, and there
are no indirect incentive effects through labor supply effects to correct for. Assume for
simplicity that the production price of both public goods are normalized to 1. The optimality
condition, found from maximizing welfare with respect to the public goods, is then simply
given by
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corresponding social marginal utility of income.4 Hence, rather then comparing the sum of
individual marginal willingness to pay for the public goods, we should compare the weighted
sums, where the weights are given by the social marginal utility of income. Since this holds
generally (given the separability assumed), it holds also for optimal non-linear income taxes.
Alternatively, we can rewrite (2) to separate out the distributional effects:
5See Kaplow (1995) and Ng (1999, 2000b) for arguments in favor of utilitarian SWFs.  
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where a bar denotes mean value and where  is the distributional characteristics of thedi
public good i. Hence, the ratio between the sums of MRS should not equal the MRT ratio
(which is normalized to one here), but rather the MRT-ratio times an expression which
compares the distributional characteristics, or the normalized covariances between the
marginal willingness to pay for the public goods and the social marginal utility of income.
Goods which are relatively more preferred by low-income people should then clearly be
over-provided compared to other goods, and vice versa. 
Consider the following stylized, but fairly realistic, example: There are 2 small public
projects to be compared: improving the local road infrastructure, and improving the public
transport system. The latter is preferred largely by low-income people, since many rich
people will continue not to use public transport irrespective of improvements. One has
undertaken surveys to elicit people’s marginal willingness to pay (WTP) for small
improvements (with equal cost) in these 2 areas, using the contingent valuation (CV)
method, and the total WTP is found to be 50% higher for the improved road infrastructure.
As is standard in CV analysis, one also asked for people’s income (net of taxes), and income
elasticities of the WTP for these projects were estimated to 1 for road infrastructure, and
0 for public transport. After-tax income in the economy is Gamma-distributed and given by:
, where . Assume also that changes in tax revenues (if any), due tof x xe x( ) = - x ³ 0
adjustments in labor supply, are expected to be the same for these projects. The social
welfare function is utilitarian5 and the social inequality aversion, measured as individual
9relative risk aversion in income, is (conservatively) assumed to 1. Which project should be
preferred? Given constant income elasticities, we can write the distributional characteristics
for any of the goods as:
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where  is the income elasticity of WTP, and s is the social inequality aversion. Imposinge
the values for  and s into (4) we get the distributional characteristics are equal to -0.5 fore
road infrastructure, and 0 for public transport. Plugging these values into (3), where good
1 is the road improvement, we see that the right-hand-side ratio is equal to 2, which is larger
than the total marginal WTP ratio of 1.5. Thus, road improvements are in this case less
socially profitable than public transport improvements, despite the fact that they would be
more profitable if we only considered efficiency aspects.
  
Separability in leisure
Consider now instead the utility function mainly discussed by Kaplow (1996) and
Christiansen (1981), where utility is separable in leisure as follows: 
(5)U u f x G G l= ( ( , , ), )1 2
In this case, as thoroughly demonstrated by both Christiansen and Kaplow, if we adjust the
income taxes on the margin so that each individual will pay exactly his marginal WTP for
the improvement, then each individual will choose exactly the same amount of leisure (and
hence labor) as before this reform. If these payments are larger than the costs of the project
the government makes a surplus, which can be distributed back to obtain a Pareto
improvement. Similarly, if these payments are not sufficient to cover the costs of the project,
a Pareto improvement can be obtained by having the project undone. In an optimal taxation
6See Sandmo (1998) for public good provision under optimal and non-optimal linear income
taxation. We will not discuss the ‘level issue’ here, i.e. compare the optimal amount provided in a
second-best economy relative to a first-best economy; for this see Wilson (1991) and Mirrlees (1994).  
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framework, any combination of marginal tax parameter changes to raise an additional dollar
is equally good (or bad) in terms of social welfare (by the envelope theorem), since
otherwise the first-order optimality conditions are not fulfilled, and taxes should be
redistributed in favor of the better means. Hence, for optimal non-linear income taxes, it is
clear that the basic Samuelson rule for provision of public goods still holds in this case. 
Now, intuitively, why do the policy conclusions come out so very differently for these
2 commonly used types of separability assumptions? In the case of separability in the public
goods (eq. 1), an increase of these goods per se does not affect labor choices. Hence, there
is no ‘distortionary cost’ of these public goods per se. In the case of separability in leisure
(eq. 5), on the other hand, a combined public good and tax increase (equal to the marginal
WTP) leaves the labor choice unaffected. Since tax changes typically affect this choice, so
does the public good provision. And the larger marginal WTP, the larger the distorting
effect of the public good provision. Hence, possibly large distributional benefits are off-set
by large distorting costs, and vice versa.  
III. THE MODIFIED SAMUELSON RULE
This section will discuss whether pulic goods shoiuld be over- or under-provided relative
to the Samuelson rule, under (some kind of) optimal income taxation.6 Let us now apply the
same type of reasoning as in the last sub-section, but this type on the case with separability
in public goods (eq. 1). Again, given optimal non-linear taxes any combination of marginal
tax-parameter changes to finance the public good is equally good in terms of social welfare.
But in this case, a payment (through a tax shift) equal to each individual’s marginal WTP
7A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for this is that leisure is a normal (or at least non-
inferior) good for all individuals. 
8See for example Stern (1976) for simulation results.
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will in general not leave labor unaffected, since there is no off-setting incentive effect from
the public good provision here. Whether the overall labor supply effect of the tax increase
will increase or decrease labor is then due to whether the income or the substitution effect
dominates. This, in turn, is of course largely given by the type of tax increase undertaken.
Assume, for example, that the marginal WTP is independent of income, i.e. what Wilson
(1991) denotes ‘distributionally neutral’ public goods, then the payment would imply the
same tax incrrease for all, independent of income. But this means that the tax shift is
basically a uniform lump-sum tax, which has no substitution effect. Since the labor supply
income effect of a tax increase is typically found to be positive (although theoretically
undetermined),7 we would expect labor to increase in this case, which, in this second-best
setting, increases welfare. Hence, it would be positive to increase the provision beyond the
Samuelson rule here. This is clearly a somewhat extreme case, an in general we would
expect marginal WTP to increase with income. The more it increases with income, the more
would the off-setting tax shift increase with income, implying that the marginal tax increases,
and the more important becomes the substitution effect, which is theoretically known to be
negative. Thus, for a sufficiently ‘regressive’ public good, we would expect an under-
provision relative to the Samuelson rule to be optimal. This gives an alternative, more
efficiency-oriented, picture of why it is optimal in this case to take distributional concern
also in public good provision. 
An optimal linear income tax (Sheshinski, 1972) consists of two parts: An optimal
uniform lump-sum tax (which is typically negative)8 and a proportional income tax. An
optimal non-linear tax (Mirrlees, 1971), on the contrary, can be seen as consisting of an
9Note that, due to the separability assumption, R is not a function of the public goods. For the
purpose here, we need not specifying R further.
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infinite number of parameters t0 to tn, where t0 is the uniform lump-sum tax, t1 is the
marginal tax rate for the first infinitesimal income unit, and so forth. We can also think of
intermediate piecewise linear cases (see e.g. Dahlby, 1998) where we can use a finite number
of parameters, for example a certain marginal tax rate up to a specific income level, and a
higher marginal tax rate beyond that level. Such income-tax systems are (with some
modifications) currently used in many countries. We can write the Lagrangean, including all
these cases, as:
(6)( ) ( )( ) ( )w G G R R Gm n m mn t t n t t l t t1 0 0 0 0,..., , ,..., ,..., , ( ,..., )- - +
where m is 1 for the linear income-tax case, and infinite for the optimal non-linear income-
tax case; ? is the indirect utility function; R0 is an exogenous public budget balance
requirement; and the function gives the tax revenues collected.9 The necessaryR m( ,..., )t t0
optimality conditions obviously include the first-order conditions for choosing the public
good G
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where  can be seen as a labor-supply tax-revenue effect of a uniform lump-sum tax. If web
increase the lump-sum tax (or decrease the lump-sum transfer) by 1 USD the additional tax
revenues with no adjustments would be n USD, and with adjustments  USD.n( )1 + b
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Combining (7) and (8) gives
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Thus, whether the public good should be over- or under-provided relative to the Samuelson
rule depends on the relative size of  (typically positive) and the distributional characteristic b d
(typically negative). Hence, again, we see that public goods which are sufficiently regressive
should be under-provided relative to the Samuelson rule, and vice versa.
IV. SPECIAL CASES
Additive separability in public goods
Boadway and Keen (1993) derived, using the self-selection approach, a result for the case
where the (common for all) utility function is additively separable (and hence also weakly
separable) as follows: 
(10)U x G G l A x l B G G( , , , ) ( , ) ( , )1 2 1 2= +
They showed that, given optimal non-linear income taxes, a public good should be over-
provided relative to the Samuelson rule if , i.e. if private consumption and leisure
¶
¶¶
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are Edgeworth complements, and vice versa. This condition is clearly independent of the
characteristics, including distributional  characteristics, of the public goods. Thus, there is
no explicit equity consideration here, despite the weakly separable public goods, which
seems to contradict the results above (eq. 3 and 9). However, as will be shown, this is an
10Assuming a utilitarian SWF we get , where  is individual marginal utility ofd
m m
= -1
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income. Hence, the larger (after-tax) inequality, the larger is the distributional characteristic (in absolute
value), reflecting the fact that the public good will then have a more equalizing effect.
. 
14
illusion. The marginal WTP for a public good is given by , with theMRS B
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of the public goods. Hence, the marginal WTP varies with income in exactly the same way
for all public goods. The distributional characteristic is given by10
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which is clearly independent of the public good, implying that the distributional
characteristics will be the same for all public goods, and the r.h.s. of eq. (3) will simply be
equal to the cost ratio. Thus, given preferences as in (10), comparing 2 (small) public
projects in terms of the benefit-cost ratio will give the same result with and without
distributional weights. 
Separability in both leisure and public goods
Consider now the special case discussed by Kaplow where people’s identical utility function
is given by
(12)U x G G l f x g G G h l( , , , ) ( ) ( , ) ( )1 2 1 2= + +
This utility function is clearly separable in both public goods and in leisure. As we have seen,
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according to the former we should apply distributional weights, but according to the latter
we should not, which seems again to indicate a contradiction. However, since (12) is a
special case of (10), the same arguments are applicable here. Hence, eq. (3), (8) and the
Samuelson rule will all hold simultaneously. In appendix it is shown that a sufficient
condition for this result is that utility is weakly separable in both leisure and the public
goods, simultaneously.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We have seen that distributional weights, equal to the social marginal utility of income,
should actually be applied in cost-benefit analysis, also when optimal non-linear income
taxes are used, given that an exogenous public good change does not affect tax revenues.
A sufficient condition for this, in turn, is that people’s utility function (which need not be
identical) are weakly separable in the public goods. On the other hand, when utility (the
same utility function for all) is weakly separable in leisure, no weights should be used, given
that one can make appropriate adjustments of the income taxation. The large difference in
policy implications between these two frequently used assumptions may seem surprising. It
should be emphasized, however, that it has of course not been shown that one generally
should be more concerned with equity in the former case compared to the latter, since the
optimal income-tax design will generally depend on whether or not distributional weights
are used in CBA. 
Now, which assumption should be seen as the most natural benchmark case? Sandmo
(1998) argues that the assumptions used by Kaplow are very strong, but the same can of
course be said about the assumptions used here. Is it reasonable that a public good increase
per se will keep the individual amount of labor supplied constant (separability in public
goods)? Or is it more reasonable that a combined public good and income-tax change, in
11In addition, ice-cream is not a public good and it is not clear why the government should
redistribute such a strictly private good in this way. (Although there may be good reasons for public
provision of some private goods; see e.g. Blomquist and Christiansen, 1995). Second, the distributional
weights normally proposed are related to the benefit, i.e., a monetary WTP measure, and not to the good
per se; It is not obvious that the poor would have the same WTP for ice-cream as the rich.
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order to keep utility constant, will hold labor fixed (separability in leisure)? Neither of these
two cases seem to give a representative picture of most public goods, and it seems likely
that different assumptions will be more or less suitable for different goods, and which case
should serve as the most natural ‘bench-mark’ appears to be an open question.
Harberger provides several examples of the negative consequences of applying
distributional weights in cost-benefit analysis. One of the more amusing deals with the
possibility of sending ice-cream on camel-back across the desert, from a richer oasis to a
poorer one (Harberger 1978, repeated in Harberger 1984). In an extreme case, when the
social inequality-aversion used is large, he asserts (Harberger 1978, p. S113) that “up to
63/64 of the ice-cream could melt away without causing the project to fail the test.” He
concludes (Harberger 1984, p. 458): “Even ways which by the traditional standards would
be scandalously inefficient would have to be explored.” But the point is that, given a SWF
sufficiently concave in income to be maximized, decreasing inequality by changes in income
taxation will have large ‘inefficiency losses’ as well.11 Consider again the initial example with
a utilitarian SWF, and where the income of a rich person is 100 times that of a poor. Then,
everything else equal, a redistribution of one dollar from the rich to the poor, through
changed income taxes, would increase social welfare if the poor would receive at least the
fraction , where e is the inequality aversion parameter, corresponding to the1 100/ e
(constant) relative risk aversion in income. Thus, this redistribution would be social welfare
improving if the marginal excess burden of this tax change would not be larger then 99%
12In the framework used here, an optimal tax would simply be a uniform lump-sum tax, which
would be a first-best instrument.
13This follows from a dual formulation of the welfare maximization problem, in terms of
minimizing efficiency losses given a certain inequality. Of course, it is implicitly assumed that it is
costly in terms of efficiency to obtain higher equality by adjusting the income tax. If it is not, the income
tax cannot be optimal.  
14Simulation results would be a useful contribution for future research to more clearly evaluate
this proposition.
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for e = 1, and 99.99% for e = 2! This illustrates clearly the problems of basing policy
conclusions on measures of efficiency losses alone. As recently expressed by Sandmo (p.
366): “Presumably the main reason why we have distortionary taxes is precisely the
distributional problem; if issues of equity and justice could be disregarded altogether, the
design of an optimal tax system would be a much less challenging task,”12 and by Dahlby
(1998, p. 113): “The problem in raising additional tax revenue is not that the marginal cost
of raising revenue is high. The problem is that the marginal cost of raising revenue in an
equitable fashion may be high.” Making non-negligible decreases in inequality between rich
and poor people will, at the margin, have large ‘inefficiency losses’, irrespective of whether
the redistribution takes place through tax changes or through public good provision.
Sometimes, these losses are shown to be lower when only making tax changes, and
sometimes they are lower when also taking distributional concern in CBA.13 Therefore, the
policy conclusion from this paper is not that one should always use distributional weights
in CBA. Rather, given the limited information typically available, it is perhaps often not be
that important, from an overall welfare point of view,whether the government deals with
distribution solely through income taxes, or whether it uses both income taxes and some
kind of distributional weights in CBA.14 
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In practice, simplicity of analysis is presumably one of the most important arguments
against using weights. For example, should the weights be based on individual or household
income? Do we have to use equivalent scales and, if so, how should these be calculated?
Should we use life-cycle income instead of current per month income (are PhD-students
poor or rich?), and if so how should this income be estimated? Which inequality aversion
should be assumed? These are clearly difficult questions, but there are also practical
arguments in favor of distributional weights. Many poor countries’ income-tax system
simply works very poorly, and equity-concerns directed through public projects may in such
countries have quite a high distributional accuracy compared to the available alternatives.
And for global problems, such as the greenhouse effect, there is no government (or other
authoritative super-national institution) at all (see Johansson-Stenman, 2000). 
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that all results discussed here are derived from
very stylized and simplified models, and there are many important problems which one is
forced to ignore on the link from fundamental ethics to actual policy recommendations
(Hausman and McPherson, 1993; Johansson-Stenman, 1998). So, in concluding it appears
very difficult to defend both the proposition that distributional weights should always be
used in CBA, and that they should never be used. 
APPENDIX:
Separability in both leisure and public goods
Utility, given these types of separabilities, can be written as the following functions:
. Using the latter function, the ratio between theu f x l G G U h x G G l( ( , ), , ) ( ( , , ), )1 2 1 2=
marginal WTP for the public goods can then be written r MRS MRS h
G
h
GG x G x
= =
2 1
2 1
¶
¶
¶
¶
 which is a function of x, G1 and G2, and clearly independent of l. But, using the former
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function, this ratio can also be written  which is a function ofr MRS MRS u
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f, G1 and G2. Hence, we can write . But then we haver s x G G t f x l G G= =( , , ) ( ( , ), , )1 2 1 2
that . But since in general  we must have that , so thatd
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r is independent of x as well. Thus, r can be written as a function solely of G1 and G2. This
means that all individuals, having the same utility function, will have the same r. The
distributional characteristics are then the same for good 1 and 2, since
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